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Abstract
Mike Wright (Wright, M. OR analysis of sporting rules – A survey. European Journal
of Operational Research, 232(1):1–8, 2014 ) recently presented a survey of sporting rules
from an Operational Research (OR) perspective. He surveyed 21 sports, which consider
the rules of sports and tournaments and whether changes have led to unintended con-
sequences. The paper concludes: “Overall, it would seem that this is just a taster and
there may be plenty more such studies to come”. In this paper we present one such
study.
This is an interdisciplinary paper, which cuts across economics, sport and operational
research (OR). We recognize that the paper could have been published in any of these
disciplines but for the sake of continuity with the paper that motivated this study, we
wanted to publish this paper in an OR journal. We look at specific examples where
the rules of sports have led to unforeseen and/or unwanted consequences. We hope
that the paper will be especially useful to sports administrators, helping them to review
what has not previously worked and also encouraging them to engage with the scientific
community when considering making changes.
We believe that this is the first time that such a comprehensive review of sporting
rules, which have led to unexpected consequences, has been published in the scientific
literature.
Keywords: Sport, Strategies, Incentives
1. Introduction
Wright (2014) recently published an invited review which looks at sporting rules
from the perspective of Operational Research (OR). He considered 21 sports, carrying
out a post–hoc analysis of rule changes, finding, for example, that changes in the rules
of volleyball did lead (as desired) to more predictable match lengths but also led to
more defensive play, which was unforeseen. Other sports have also changed their scoring
systems in a similar way. These include squash, ping pong, beach volleyball, badminton,
lawn bowls and tennis (for example the Mixed Double’s final set being played as a
“Super–Tie Break”, sometimes referred to as a “best of two” format).
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It might be assumed that rules for a given sport remain relatively static. This might
be true for many sports, but for some sports rules change almost every year. The
Australian Football League is one such example. Figure 11, shows that in the first two
decades following the formation of their Rules Committee in 1994, 51 rule changes were
made, with only 2010 having no changes. This compares to only 17 rule changes over
the previous 20 years (1974-1993), with 12 years seeing no changes. We suspect that
some changes were necessitated by unintended consequences of earlier rule changes. An
example is the 2006 changes which allowed a player taking a kick-out from a behind to
proceed without waiting for the goal umpire to finish waving his/her flags. We believe
this caused the frequency of rushed behinds (exhibiting negative play) to increase over
the following two years, culminating in Hawthorn’s 11 rushed behinds in their 2008
Grand Final defeat of Geelong. This resulted in a rule change in 2009 preventing rushed
behinds unless under immediate pressure from an opposition player. Other rule changes
were also due to the fact that the Australian Football Council was disbanded and the
AFL Rules Committee came into existence and started a series of rule changes to both
clean up, and speed up, the game2. We note that under the Australian Football Council
governance structure, rule changes were harder to pass because it required a double
majority vote. There is nothing to suggest that the number of rule changes in the AFL
will decrease3.
Figure 1: Number of AFL Rule Changes, by Year (1970-2013)
Wright (2014) suggested that further studies may be possible and this paper is one
such study that considers specific examples from a number of sports to see where rules
had unintended consequences, many of which are seen as controversial. Some of these
are drawn from Wright (2014), but more detail is given than was possible in that paper.
Others are drawn from our own knowledge and experience. We believe that our study
is comprehensive but by no means exhaustive. We hope that this interdisciplinary
paper, which cuts across economics, sport and OR makes a contribution to all these
areas but, more importantly, it will enable the community to further study games,
incentives and strategies in what is a highly competitive environment. Furthermore,
the pitfalls of sports rules provide useful analogies to policymakers, highlighting the
importance of effective public policy design to improve societal and economic outcomes
by circumventing perverse incentives and other suboptimal characteristics.
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We also recognise that administrators have competing objectives (provide entertain-
ment, ensure the sport is profitable, develop the sport etc.), whereas a single athlete’s
aim is typically to win. Athletes will also want to set records, feature in the record
books, become recognised by the public, develop contracts with commercial companies
etc., but all of these are dependent on them winning, even if this is at the detriment of
other objectives, such as entertaining the crowd. Some athletes may want to play more
attractively, but may also have the attitude that it is the administrators’ responsibility
to set the right incentives for them to do so, allowing them to satisfy this objective
while seeking to simultaneously satisfy their own. This can raise tensions in areas such
as tanking (the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to gain
some other advantage) where it is seen as being against the spirit of the game but does
meet the objective of the athlete, yet not the administrators. Examples of tanking are
a feature of this paper, occurring in several sports.
We note that there are many references to URLs in this paper (all last accessed,
April 2016). We recognize that it is not normal to include so many URLs in a peer
reviewed scientific paper but much of what we report has not been reported in the
scientific literature and we hope that the URLs provide additional material (such as
videos of sporting plays, interviews, etc.) which are of interest to the reader.
1.1. Structure of the Paper
We faced a decision as to how to structure the paper. Would it be best to structure
the examples around particular sports (e.g. badminton, football, rugby etc.), or would
it be better to structure it around sporting events (e.g. Olympics, world cups etc.),
even on some other basis? There is no perfect answer, but we have structured the paper
alphabetically by sport (Section 3), as this is likely to be how the majority of readers
would wish to access the paper. For example, sports administrators and fans who wish
to focus on a particular sport. Where necessary, we have cross-referenced material to
provide access to related material. In Section 4 we have provided examples (Salary
Caps, Player Drafts and Tournament Formats), which cut across a number of sports for
which we felt that it would not be sensible to split into specific sports.
2. Related Work
This paper considers the unexpected consequences of when rules are either changed,
or when existing rules lead to unforeseen events due to specific, and often unusual,
circumstances. Lack of rules, for a given situation, could also be problematic. One
of the reasons why rule changes can lead to situations in which the administrators
and supporters would prefer not to happen is that it is difficult to trial changes in
practice. Even if they could be tested, it is unlikely that all rogue cases would be
revealed. However, it is not always the case that the effect of possible rule changes
cannot be studied, at least statistically, to provide some level of confidence that a rule
change would have. In this related work, we draw out some of the studies that have
been reported in the scientific literature studying rule changes. We would also refer the
reader to Wright (2014) for more examples.
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Lenten and Winchester (2015) studied (competition) bonus points in Super Rugby.
Some sports do not just attribute winning with being the primary consideration, but the
margin of the win (or achieving a certain scoring outcome) may lead to bonus points.
These rules are designed to motivate more attacking play, leading to more excitement
for the supporters. Lenten and Winchester refer to this as a secondary reward. They
studied the last eight minutes to see if playing behavior changed. They concluded that
it did, and in a way that was seen as favorable by the administrators. They further
conclude that the Six Nations Championship and Australia’s National Rugby League
could also benefit from a similar bonus points system due to a decline in the number of
tries in these competitions. The paper concluded by saying: “... the results show how
the awarding of league points can, to a degree, be used to alter tactics in ways deemed
favourable by administrators.”
Penalty shootouts in football are seen by many as an unacceptable way to end
a football match, leading to cautious play during extra time. Lenten et al. (2013)
suggest that a shootout could alternatively be held before extra time, with the result
determining the match winner only if the subsequent extra time fails to deliver a result.
Their inference is that this would result in more attacking play during extra time. Of
course, to see the results of these proposed changes would require empirical evidence by
actually introducing the rule in a live (and probably more than one) competition, but
their binary-response models using existing match data robustly estimate that the odds
of scoring in extra time would increase three-fold, with the FIFA World Cup and the
UEFA club competitions having a probable increase in scoring outcomes of 45%-60%.
One of the challenges in generating a set of fixtures is to create a schedule that
is seen to be fair both before and after the games are played. The OR literature has
many examples that report how sports schedules can be generated (e.g. Goossens and
Spieksma (2012); Kendall (2008); Rasmussen (2008); Bartsch et al. (2006); Croce and
Oliveri (2006); Wright (2006)). As a demonstration of the importance of the schedule
to the underlying economics, Lenten (2015) considers the bias of the schedules for the
2002-2011 National Football League (NFL) seasons and modifies a recently introduced
model (Lenten, 2011) to provide an assessment of how these (unbalanced) scheduling
biases affect the competitive balance of such leagues. There are several surveys available
(e.g. Ribeiro (2012); Kendall et al. (2010); Wright (2009); Rasmussen and Trick (2008))
on sports scheduling which, some would argue, is one of the most important aspects of
designing fair sporting competitions.
3. Examples from Specific Sports
In this section, we provide many examples of when sports rules caused unexpected
results. Many of these are well known to the relevant sporting community, but have not
been recorded in the scientific literature. Due to this, we have had to provide links to
news stories, or to videos, which highlights the example under discussion. We hope that
by providing details here, this can be used as a future point of reference for the scientific
community. We provide comments wherever we feel that we have something to add to
the discussion.
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3.1. Athletics: False Starts
It is known that some swimmers and particularly runners (specifically sprinters)
used to false start strategically as part of their game plan to psych-out their fellow
competitors. While it used to build drama in some cases it has become almost ridiculous.
While far from the worst case, the 1996 Olympic Mens 100m Final is worth watching4.
A brief description of how the IAAF rules have changed is as follows. From 2003,
IAAF rules stated that after any false start was committed, all athletes were to be
warned. Any subsequent false start by any athlete(s) led to immediate disqualification
of that athlete(s). Previously, disqualification only occurred after the same athlete
false-started twice. In August 2009 the IAAF announced that from January 2010, a
zero-tolerance stance to false starts would be adopted. Athletes false-starting are now
immediately disqualified.
While the rule change has indeed worked as intended, it creates a double-edged
sword. Specifically, the obvious downside is the possibility of high-profile disqualifica-
tions before the race is effectively run, of which there were quite a few in the 2011 World
Championships in Daegu, none more so than Usain Bolt 5.
Other Olympic examples can be seen in Sections 3.3.1, 3.8.1 and 3.9.8.
3.2. Australian Football - AFL
As well as being a sport that has seen a lot of rule changes in recent years (see
Section 1) the AFL has a best player award every year, the Brownlow Medal6, which
dates back to 1924. The vote count has now become a huge television event.
It has a peculiarity that we are not aware exists elsewhere. It is not only a ‘best’
award, but also the ‘fairest’, insofar that any player who is reported for any on-field
offense, for which that player is suspended (even for one match), then becomes ineligible
to win it in that year (in 2005, the criteria were altered slightly to accommodate changes
to the tribunal system). Among other reasons, this rule acts as a further incentive
especially for star players to remain clean. The award is for most votes, with a 3-2-1
system in each match, given by the umpires who also report players for offenses.
In 1996, three players (for the first time) tied for the most number of votes. However,
also for the first time, one of them (Corey McKernan) was ineligible. Therefore, only
the other two shared the award. A news report7 is available. To add insult to injury,
the reportable offense for which he was made ineligible was questionable at best. The
following year (1997), history repeated itself. This time Chris Grant would have won
the medal outright, as he had finished one vote ahead of winner Robert Harvey. This
has not occurred since, yet the rule still persists.
Public perception is mixed on this. Some would take the view that it is a huge
embarrassment if the vote-leader is ineligible, while others would claim it as evidence
that the rule is doing exactly as intended – maintaining fair play.
3.3. Badminton
3.3.1. Women’s Doubles Badminton at the 2012 Olympics
In the initial stages of the badminton competition in the 2012 Olympics, eight women
players (both South Korea teams and one team each from China and Indonesia) were
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disqualified from the competition. The women were charged with “not using one’s best
efforts to win a match” and “conducting oneself in a manner that is clearly abusive or
detrimental to the sport.” They were found guilty of trying to throw matches in order
to get (perceived) easier draws in the knockout stages of the competition.
To give one example of the circumstances that led to these disqualifications, table 1
shows the state of the competition before the last Group A game. Russia and Canada
had completed all their matches. Korea and China had won all their previous matches
(i.e. they had both beaten Russia and Canada) so, in effect, they were playing for first
and second place in the group. The first-placed team were to play the second-placed
team from Group C in the quarter-finals, where the second-placed team would play the
top-placed team from Group C.
However, it is believed that China and Korea were looking further ahead in the
draw. Due to the timing of the games, the final positions of Group D were already
known before the last Group A game started. Another China team (referred to as C2)
were placed second in Group D. This meant that they were in the top half of the draw,
going into the quarter finals. The second-placed teams in Group A would be in the
bottom half of the draw and could not face C2 until the final. Once this tactic became
apparent, Korea (another Korean team) also tried to lose their final game in Group C
(against Indonesia) to subvert the plan, resulting in four teams being disqualified.
Table 1: Group A table of the Badminton Women’s Doubles at the 2012 Olympics
Played Won Lost Sets Won Sets Lost Points
Korea 2 2 0 4 0 2
China 2 2 0 4 0 2
Russia 3 1 2 2 4 1
Canada 3 0 3 0 6 0
Comments: We assume that the tournament structure was established so that there
is an incentive to top your group so that you earn an easier match in the quarter-finals
as you would be playing a second-placed team. The teams in question were obviously
looking further ahead than just the quarter-finals. There might be some merit in timing
the final-group matches at the same time, as is done in other tournaments, although in
this case it would not have had any effect as the bottom-two teams (in both Groups A
and C) were already eliminated as the top two teams had already beaten both those
teams.
An alternative is to draw the quarter-finals only after all the group matches have
taken place. There could be some seeding to stop the top teams being drawn against
each other although, in our view, this might not be a bad thing as a ‘fair’ draw would
stop teams speculating how the knockout stages would play out and play the group
matches accordingly.
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This Badminton match is an example of tanking ; the act of deliberately dropping
points or losing a game in order to gain an advantage. It is generally felt to be against
the spirit of the game. Tanking in other sports is discussed in Sections 3.6, 3.11.2, 3.12.2
and 4.1 (Point 1). Other Olympic examples can be seen in Sections 3.1, 3.8.1 and 3.9.8.
3.4. Baseball
3.4.1. Forcing a Walk
In baseball, if four balls have been pitched outside of the strike zone (meaning that
it is difficult, or impossible for the batter to hit), the player on strike gets a free walk to
first base. However, there are incidents in which the fielding team would like a player
to walk, so the pitcher intentionally pitches outside of the strike zone. We assume that
forcing an unintentional walk was not an intended consequence when the rules were
drawn up, although it seems to be an accepted part of the game now.
However exploiting this rule can sometimes go wrong. There are examples8 where a
pitcher was attempting to force batter to walk, but the batter managed to hit the ball,
leading to a run being scored.
3.4.2. Designated–Hitter Rule
The ‘Designated–Hitter’ rule in Major League Baseball (MLB) is a favourite rule
oddity of research in economics, specifically as a way of testing moral hazard effects
arising from its implementation. MLB rule 6.10 states that a designated hitter “... may
be designated to bat for the starting pitcher and all subsequent pitchers in any game”.
The rule was introduced in MLB’s American League (AL) in 1973, to tilt the balance of
power in the game back towards batters, during an era in which pitchers had been more
dominant for quite some time. Meanwhile, MLB’s other half – the National League (NL)
– has never implemented the rule. The rule has been effective in its primary intention
– the AL has since posted consistently higher batting averages than the NL. However,
(among its various other unintended consequences) because under this rule pitchers do
not have to bat themselves, there may exist a moral hazard by which they are more
likely to hit opposition batters on the body while pitching, as there is effectively no
chance of reprisal by an opposition pitcher gaining revenge for their teammate(s).
The rule is attractive to economists because the AL and NL provide a very rare
example in the sports industry of two leagues that are highly comparable in all aspects
– other than this rule. Thus, the rule itself provides an unusually natural experimental
framework in which incentives induced by a playing rule can be tested robustly. Signif-
icant contributions in the sports economics literature here have been provided by Goff
et al. (1997, 1998); Bradbury and Drinen (2006), who all show that the rule produces
a higher rate of hit batters in the AL. The evidence is particularly clean prior to 1997,
when AL and NL teams never played each other during the regular season. Since the
introduction of this ‘interleague play’, however, the comparison is less clear, as inter-
league matches invariably involve one team playing under designated hitter conditions
that they are not normally accustomed to.
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3.5. Basketball
The three–point shot, a shot from behind a designated line (a shot on or inside the
line scores only two points) potentially enables teams to score a lot of points quickly,
particularly towards the end of the game when the points gap could be large. The rule
became popular after the now–defunct American Basketball Association introduced it
in the 1967–68 season, although it was used before this.
Ray Stefani, in a blog post for the New York Times9 has studied the effect of this
rule, showing that it is not always best to adopt a strategy to go for three–points. For
example, he notes that the team who shot the lower percentage of three–pointers from
beyond the three–point line won 32 out of 48 games (in the N.C.A.A. men’s basketball
tournament) and won seven out of eight games (Round–of–16 matchups and all four
regional finals).
Although it might look like a good idea to try and score three–point shots, Stefani
concludes: “Looking only at percent 3s, Kentucky would beat Kansas in the final. Memo
to coaches: stick to about a quarter of threes: total shots, free throws, rebounds and total
points will all take care of themselves”, concluding that teams overuse the three–point
option and they should limit these attempts to about 25% of the time.
Comments: This rule change has not led to any dramatic consequences but is
an example of teams not recognizing how to adapt to the change. It appears that they
are drawn to the incentive of larger point gains, but do not realize the dangers of doing
this. That is, the advantages can easily outweigh the disadvantages due to an over
expectation of the abilities of the players to score from the 3–point zone.
3.6. Tanking in Basketball
In the 2014 FIBA Basketball World Cup Australia rested their key players in their
final group match at the end of the game against Angola. This enabled Angola to win
91–83, noting Australia were leading by 42–29 at half time. The suspicion of tanking was
leveled at Australia as losing that game meant they finished in third place which delayed
meeting the United States until the semi–finals, rather than the quarter–finals. In fact,
Australia unexpectedly lost by one point (65–64) to Turkey in the next round. Australia
were later investigated, and subsequently cleared, of tanking. Tanking in other sports
is discussed in Sections 3.3.1, 3.11.2, 3.12.2 and 4.1 (Point 1). There is more discussion
on basketball in Section 4.1, item 1.
3.7. Cricket
3.7.1. Duckworth/Lewis Method
The Duckworth/Lewis (D/L) Method (Duckworth and Lewis, 1998) system in cricket
is undoubtedly one of the successful rule changes that has improved the game. The
system is used to determine the winner of a rain–affected match. The model takes into
account the number of wickets remaining and the number of balls left to bowl. These
are used to set a revised target for the team that is batting, which has a lesser number
of balls than their opponents.
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Prior to the D/L system being adopted, other systems had been used that adjusted
the total for a rain–affected match. A match that highlighted the problems with the
‘run–rate’ method was between Australia and the West Indies in the World Series, played
on 18 January 1989 in Sydney. The rules gifted the match to the side batting second.
We can do no better than quote an (edited) match report10.
“West Indies won by eight wickets being set a revised target of 108 in eighteen overs.
The World Series Cup of 1988–89 could hardly have had a less satisfactory ending. The
toss virtually decided it, not because the pitch, now being used for the third time in seven
days, cracked up, but as a result of the regulations, which, in the event of much rain,
are too heavily loaded in favour of the side batting second.
There were two stoppages, the first of two hours during Australia’s innings, the second
of 85 minutes soon after West Indies had set out to make 227 to win at 5.97 runs an
over.
When the players went off for the first time Australia were 83 for two. Left with
only another 14.5 overs’ batting after the resumption – it had by then become a 38–overs
match – they scored a further 143 runs. When the West Indian innings was interrupted
they were 47 for two after only 6.4 overs. With the rain relenting soon after nine o’clock,
just in time for the match not to be abandoned and another started next day, West Indies
found their requirement reduced from 180 in 31.2 overs to 61 from 11.2 overs. Most sides
would have expected to achieve that. In the post–mortem Australia’s captain called for
the regulations to be revised; Richards was happy with them as they were.”
As a counter example, a match between England and South Africa, again in Sydney,
on 22 March 1992 in the World Cup semi–final made it impossible for the team batting
second to win by virtue of the most productive overs rule. Again, we quote from the
(edited) match report11.
“This game’s closing minutes buried South Africa’s World Cup hopes, and whatever
credibility the rain rule had retained. By putting pressure on the team batting second,
the rule supposedly created exciting finishes; on this occasion 12 minutes’ heavy rain,
when South Africa needed 22 from 13 balls, adjusted their target first to 22 from seven,
and then to 21 from one. McMillan could only take a single off Lewis. The losers were
disconsolate, the winners embarrassed, and the crowd furious. Why, they asked, were
the two overs not played out under the floodlights?
The majority blamed the World Cup’s organising committee, and the inflexibility
which prevented a second–day resumption. (The next day was set aside only for a com-
pletely new match, to be played if the second team had not faced 25 overs.) Justice
was probably done; Wessels chose to field, knowing the rules and the forecast, and his
bowlers were fined for going slow and depriving England of five overs’ acceleration. But
it was not seen to be done, and fine performances on both sides were overshadowed by
indignation.”
The D/L Method has now been adopted worldwide and has helped to decide many
rain–affected matches, with most observers believing that it is an improved, and fair
method. However, there have been examples of where the D/L Method has not had the
intended consequence. In 2009 (4 June), in an English domestic T20 match between
9
Sussex and Kent12, at the end of their innings, Sussex had scored 131 for the loss of
three wickets, in the alloted 20 overs. In the 11th over Kent fell behind the required run
rate for only the second time. It was at this point that Sussex’s captain called up a
fast bowler. A report of the game suggests that the captain knew what he was doing –
“With his team’s noses in front, Yardy called up Robin Martin–Jenkins to bowl from the
gloomy Cromwell Road End.”12 The umpires consulted and decided that due to fading
light (the umpires had been informed that the floodlights would not be available), and
the change to a fast bowler, it would pose a danger to the batsman, the teams would
have to leave the pitch. Using the D/L Method, this meant that Sussex won by two
runs, with nine overs still remaining.
In the 2003 (3 March) World Cup, South Africa’s captain, Shaun Pollock, admitted
miscalculating in the final group–stage match with Sri Lanka13. Sri Lanka had scored
268, requiring South Africa to score 269 to win, and they needed to win to progress.
However, a rain storm was likely and South Africa knew that the D/L Method might
come into play, so they had to ensure that they kept up with the D/L calculated total.
As the rain started, the South African’s reached 229 (by virtue of a six), which was
now level with the revised total. Some of the South African team, and supporters,
celebrated and the final ball was simply guided around the wicket, thinking that it
was of no consequence. In fact, South Africa needed one more run as the 229 resulted
in a drawn match. The points were shared, resulting in South Africa’s exit from the
competition.
Comments: Although there have been a couple of examples where D/L has caused
some problems, it is generally accepted as being a fair system and resolves the problem of
rain–interrupted matches. The fact that it has been in use since 1997 is testament to its
robustness. Research still continues into the method (e.g. Duckworth and Lewis (2004);
Stern (2009); Shah et al. (2015)) demonstrating that it is subject to refinement. We
would suggest that the D/L Method provides an excellent example of how the sporting
community, and the scientific community, are able to collaborate in a way that meets
the needs of both parties.
The Duckworth/Lewis Method is often cited as a (if not the) leading example of OR
making an impact in the real world. Dr Anthony Lewis returned the D/L Method in the
UK’s 2014 REF (Research Excellence Framework) as one of Oxford Brookes University
impact case studies14 to highlight the impact that its research is making.
We would hope that there could be more of this type of collaborative activity in
the future as both parties (academics and sports administrators) could benefit mutually
from working together.
Finally, we note that the Duckworth/Lewis method is now known more formally
as the Duckworth/Lewis/Stern method after Stern Software revised the algorithm15.
We have used the more familiar Duckworth/Lewis name in this paper as, at the time
of writing, this is how it is more familiarly known and we did not want to introduce
confusion.
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Table 2: Group B table of the 1999 Cricket World Cup before the Australia/West Indies match
Played Won Lost NRR Pts
Pakistan 4 4 0 0.97 8
West Indies 4 3 1 0.88 6
Australia 4 2 2 0.77 4
New Zealand 4 2 2 0.00 4
Bangladesh 4 1 3 -1.01 2
Scotland 4 0 4 -1.61 0
3.7.2. 30 May 1999 – Australia vs West Indies World Cup 1999
The 1999 Cricket World Cup was hosted in England, with some games being played
in Scotland, Ireland, Wales and the Netherlands.
The twelve participating teams were split into two groups (Group A and Group B)
of six teams. Within these groups each team played every other team, so each group
comprised 15 games (n(n−1)/2, where n = 6) The top three from each group progressed
to the second round (called the ‘Super Six’) stage. In this stage, each team from Group
A, played each team from Group B. The teams carried forward their points from the
initial group stages against the teams who progressed from the same group. The top
four teams from the Super Sixes contested the semi-finals.
In the 1999 World Cup, a group match between Australia and West Indies should
have been an easy win for Australia, when the West Indies only scored 110 runs in 46.4
overs (it was a fifty–over match). This was an easy target for Australia but it took them
40.4 overs to reach the required 111 runs (for 4–wickets), with the final 24 runs taking
Stephen Waugh and Michael Bevan 14.4 overs. To understand why it took Australia so
long to reach this target, we need to delve a little deeper.
Table 2 shows the league table before the Australia/West Indies match and Table 3
shows the Group B table after the match.
The telling statistic is the secondary criterion used in this tournament to separate
teams tied on points – the Net Run Rate (NRR). The net run rate is a measure that
compares the number of runs scored against all your opponents, compared to the runs
that your opponents have scored against you. It also takes into account the number
of overs. If the team is all out, then the full 50 overs is used, but if you are chasing a
total and achieve the required total in (say) 40 overs, then that figure is used. A full
description can be seen at the CricInfo web site16.
You will note that after the match, Australia’s NRR had dropped from 0.77 to 0.73.
West Indies NRR had dropped from 0.88 to 0.50.
Table 4 shows Australia’s rolling five–over run rate between overs 25 and 34. It is
apparent that Australia’s scoring is slowing down. If Australia had continued to score
at around four an over, the match would have completed at around over 32. This would
have given Australia a NRR = 0.94 and West Indies a NRR = 0.3817.
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Table 3: Group B table of the 1999 Cricket World Cup after the Australia/West Indies match
Played Won Lost NRR Pts
Pakistan 4 4 0 0.97 8
Australia 5 3 2 0.73 6
West Indies 5 3 2 0.50 6
New Zealand 4 2 2 0.00 4
Bangladesh 4 1 3 -1.01 2
Scotland 4 0 4 -1.61 0
So, what motivated Australia to go slow? Earlier in the tournament, New Zealand
had beaten Australia18. It was in Australia’s interest and, by extension, also in the
interest of the West Indies, to try and get West Indies to qualify over New Zealand.
If it came down to points, the NRR could be the deciding factor so it was in both
teams’ interest to keep the West Indies NRR as high as possible. There is no proof
of cooperation between the two captains, but it was in both their interests to prolong
Australia’s innings, which was ultimately down to the way that the tournament had
been designed. A further example of tacit collusion, or emerging cooperation?
The plan (if there was one) did not work out entirely. New Zealand, playing the
next day, hence knowing the equation, bowled out Scotland cheaply and mowed down
the target just quickly enough (17.5 overs) to sneak into third place marginally ahead
of the West Indies, anyway. Rather than the 40.4 overs it actually took, Australia,
had they gone a few more overs closer to the 47.2 they needed as a maximum to finish
ahead of West Indies, could have made it even more difficult for New Zealand. Australia
consequently had to win their next five games in succession (although they actually drew
their semi–final against South Africa, proceeding on a better super six placing), rather
than having the comfort of (all other things being equal), being able to lose one of their
following three games in the second–round, and still go through to the semi–finals.
Australia went on to win the World Cup.
3.7.3. Australia vs New Zealand – World Series Cup – 01 February 1981
In a game between Australia and New Zealand, where the series had already been
subject to a number of controversies, in the final game New Zealand needed six runs off
the last ball to draw the game. The Australian captain (Greg Chappell) instructed the
bowler, Trevor Chappell (his younger brother) to bowl underarm, along the ground, so
that the batsman could not score a six from the ball.
This was within the rules at the time but was considered to be against the spirit
of the game. One of the commentators (Ian Chappell, former Australian captain and
elder brother of the two Chappells on the field) was heard to say “No, Greg, no, you
can’t do that”. In the Youtube video19 (see around 4 mins, 55 secs) Australian wicket–
keeper Rodney Marsh is seen shaking his head and saying “No, mate”. Richie Benaud,
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Table 4: Australia’s rolling 5–over run rate from overs 25–34
Over Score Run Rate – Last 5 overs
25 83/4 4.20
26 87/4 3.80
27 90/4 3.40
28 92/4 3.60
29 92/4 3.00
30 92/4 1.80
31 92/4 1.00
32 98/4 1.60
33 99/4 1.40
34 101/4 1.80
also a former Australian captain and commentating on The Nine Network described
the incident as “disgraceful”, saying it was one of the worst things he had seen on a
cricket field and called for an immediate rule change (see around 5 mins, 55 secs to 8
mins, 23 secs)19, explaining that underarm deliveries had been disallowed in the official
Test rules but this particular tournament (World Series Cup) had its own rules. Both
country’s Prime Ministers were critical of the decision.
As a direct result of this incident, the International Cricket Council banned underarm
bowling in limited overs cricket as “being against the spirit of the game”.
3.7.4. Incidents
In this section, we list a number of incidents, which have occurred in cricket, often
resulting in rule changes.
1. Mike Brearley, the England captain in the 1979–80 (non–Ashes) Test series against
Australia, objected to the use of an aluminum bat by Dennis Lillee, rather than
one made of the more traditional willow, when he came out to bat in the Perth
test. The basis of the complaint was that it was damaging the ball, even though
the bat had been used in a previous Test in Brisbane against Sri Lanka with no
complaints from the opposing team20.
The umpires consulted with each other, but the matter was resolved by the Aus-
tralian captain who sent for a willow bat for Lillee to use.
These days, the rules are well covered.
2. In a limited–overs match between England and the West Indies in Sydney, in 1979,
Brearley again caused controversy by ordering all his fielders, including the wick-
etkeeper, to the boundary. Three runs were required off the last ball and by doing
this he believed that it would be much more difficult to get the required number
of runs. This was legal at the time but we believe that this led to introduction of
the inner circle and fielding restrictions. The rules have changed over the years,
but they are designed to encourage the batter to play shots, and try to hit fours
and sixes.
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3. In a limited–overs (55) match that took place on 24 May 1979 between Worcester
and Somerset, Brian Rose, the captain of Somerset, knew that Somerset would
qualify for the quarter–finals of the tournament as long as they did not lose by a
heavy margin.
To achieve this, he declared after the first over, with the score at 1 run for 0
wickets (the over was actually a maiden, with the one run coming from a no–ball).
Worcestershire took just ten balls to score the two runs required and the match
was over in just 18 minutes, which included a ten–minute break between innings.
Some spectators had not even taken their seats and many had traveled a long way
to see eight minutes of cricket.
What Rose had done was within the laws of the game (he had checked with the
Test & County Cricket Board beforehand), but it was certainly outside the spirit of
the game. Ironically, if Somerset had lost the game they still would have qualified
for the quarter–finals as Glamorgan‘s game against Minor Counties was washed
out and they did not achieve the victory they needed.
Eight days later, the Test & County Cricket Board called an emergency meeting
of its disciplinary committee. They voted to expel Somerset from the competition
(17 to 1). Even Somerset supported the motion (Derbyshire opposed it). The
TCCB said that Rose’s action was “against the spirit of the game” and that it
had “brought the game into disrepute”.
Comments: Even though the Test & County Cricket Board actions could be
seen as being morally right, there is an argument that Somerset were punished
for not breaching any rules. This is a rare scenario where no rules were broken,
yet sanctions were imposed anyway under the banner of ‘bringing the game into
disrepute’.
4. A similar incident to the one above occurred during the 1991/92 Sheffield Shield
(Australia’s domestic long–form cricket competition) season (12–15 December 1991).
Favorites New South Wales (NSW) had started the season slowly and needed a
few outright wins. Playing Tasmania at the Sydney Cricket Ground was a perfect
opportunity to get the full six points. However, torrential storms on the first two
days meant that only a few overs had been bowled in Tasmania’s first innings. On
a rain–affected swinging pitch, NSW bowled out Tasmanian cheaply (144), when
play resumed on day 3. Despite first–innings points looking almost certain, cap-
tain Geoff Lawson opted to declare the NSW first innings at 0/0. He was relying
on being able to bowl out Tasmania cheaply for a second time, and then chase
down a modest target. The scorecard21 shows that it almost worked. At 132/2,
chasing 261, the probability of them winning was high, but a late collapse saw
them fall 48 runs short.
5. For many years, teams had used a tactic of bowling down the leg side and packing
that side of the field in the hope that the batsman, in trying to steer the ball
through these fielders would nick the ball and be caught out. It was not popular,
but widely practised and was also known by the term leg theory.
In the 1932–33 Australia v England series, England took this to new levels, mainly
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in an attempt to try and control Donald Bradman. They bowled at the body, not
just to restrict, but also to intimidate. This ultimately led to a change in the rules
so that only two fielders are allowed behind square on the leg side, thus making
body lining impractical.
Many years later, during the 1970’s to 1980’s, bouncers were used to intimidate
the batsman. In 1991, the International Cricket Council (ICC) introduced a ‘one
bouncer per batsman per over’ rule in an attempt to discourage this use of intim-
idation.
The ruling was not well received by players or umpires. English umpire Dickie Bird
commented that it was farcical, believing that the decision of whether actions
were intimidating should be left to the umpires. The rule was changed to two
bouncers per over in 1994, with a two–run no–ball penalty if the bowler exceeded
two bouncers an over. The ICC reverted to one bouncer per over in 2001, with a
one–run no–ball penalty.
6. In a rain affected match, the 2007 World Cup Final between Australia and Sri
Lanka was reduced to 38 overs each. Further rain reduced Sri Lanka to 36 overs,
who were chasing a total of 281, which was reduced to 269 under the Duckworth–
Lewis method. After the 33rd over, the umpires called the players off due to bad
light. The Australian team celebrated as they (correctly) believed that they had
won but the umpires said that the final three overs had to be played as the match
was suspended due to bad light and not rain. They said that these overs would be
played the next day. Sri Lanka agreed to play the final three overs that evening as
they required 61 runs from 18 balls, which was improbable. The last three overs
were played in almost complete darkness (as the ground did not have floodlights),
with Australia agreeing to only play spin bowlers. Australia won by 53 runs under
the Duckworth–Lewis method. The umpires later apologized for the error.
7. In the 2007 World Cup, India unexpectedly lost their first match to Bangladesh
and found themselves eliminated after only nine days, with the tournament then
running for a further five weeks without them. Ratings and ICC revenue fell to well
below expectations due to hundreds of millions of Indian televisions being switched
off almost simultaneously. It might not be a surprise that the tournament format
for the following World Cup in 2011 reverted to an earlier (1996 World Cup) format
with two groups and a knockout–stage from the quarter–finals. This ensured India
would remain in the tournament for as long as possible. This is an example of
when one team is such a draw that they are needed in the tournament for as long
as possible.
8. Test cricket is an oddity in that test series between some countries sometimes
have a bilateral trophy on offer. The Ashes between England and Australia is
good example. Not only is the test series at stake but the winners (importantly)
also get to keep an 11cm–high trophy. If the test series is a draw, the urn is kept
by the country that currently holds it. This fact could influence the way that
series are played, and almost certainly would in the case of the Ashes, as winning
the series is far less important to the holders than not losing (drawing) the series.
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Let us take a theoretical example. Assume an Ashes test series is poised at 2–2,
and England are the current holders. A final draw is good enough for England to
retain the Ashes, but not good enough for Australia to win them. It is easy to see
how the Australian captain would be willing to take chances to give his team every
possible chance of winning the decider. If there were no Ashes to play for, and
it is purely a test series, the captain might become more defensive, being happy
with a draw, rather than risking a loss.
3.8. Cycling
3.8.1. Men’s Cycling Team Sprint at the 2012 Olympics
In an interview (2 August 2012), after the Men’s cycling team sprint, Great Britain’s
Philip Hindes said that he had deliberately crashed in an earlier round as he had not
liked his start, so he wanted to have a restart. He was quoted as saying “We were saying
if we have a bad start we need to crash to get a restart. I just crashed, I did it on purpose
to get a restart, just to have the fastest ride. I did it. So it was all planned, really.”22
The British later claimed that it was misunderstanding as English is not Hindes’ first
language.
In the team sprints, restarts are allowed if a rider falls or has a mechanical fault. The
judges ordered a restart, unaware at that time of the comments that would be made
later. The team in second place accepted that the result would stand but suggested that
the rules need to change.23
Comments: It would appear strange that a cyclist falling means that a restart
would take place and leaves the sport open to participants simply falling off until they
get the start they desire. If this happened in another sport then the race would not be
restarted. For example, in F1 Motor Racing, if a car has a mechanical problem there
is no provision to restart the race. It would appear that the regulation governing team
sprints would benefit from being reviewed.
Other Olympic examples can be seen in Sections 3.1, 3.3.1 and 3.9.8.
3.9. Football
In this section we take the meaning of football to be the European meaning, rather
than the US meaning. The Australian version of the game (AFL) can be seen in Section
3.2. The USA version of the game (NFL) can be seen in Section 3.13.
3.9.1. 25 June 1982 – Austria vs West Germany, El Molino´n Stadium, Gijo´n, Spain
This match was the final game of the first-round stage (Group 2) of the 1982 FIFA
World Cup. The other teams in the group, Algeria and Chile, had played each other
the previous day. Before the game between Austria and West Germany, the group table
stood as shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: Group 2 table of the 1982 FIFA World Cup before the final match between Austria and West
Germany
Team Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts
Austria 2 2 0 0 3 0 +3 4
Algeria 3 2 0 1 5 5 0 4
West Germany 2 1 0 1 5 3 +2 2
Chile 3 0 0 3 3 8 -5 0
A win by West Germany would place three teams on four points (a win was worth
two points). If teams were level on points the first tie–breaker was goal difference. If
Germany won by one (two resp.) goal(s), their goal difference would be +3 (+4 resp.),
but Austria would drop to +2 (+1 resp.). This would mean that Austria and West
Germany would both progress to the next stage. If Germany won by more than two
goals then Austria would have the same goal difference (or worse) than Algeria which
would put Algeria through.
After ten minutes West Germany scored. This removed any incentive for either team
to score any more goals. Why should Germany attack in order to try and score a second
goal, risking Austria scoring a goal on the break? Why should Austria attack, risking
further goals being scored against it, which would risk its goal difference being further
eroded?
The result was a boring game for the remaining 80 minutes, with no team really
making an effort to score, often passing between their own players in their own half.
The Algerian fans were naturally upset, but so were some of the Austrian and West
German fans who wanted to see a competitive match. There were reports of a West
German fan at the game burning his own flag in the stands and many of the local
Spanish fans were waving their handkerchiefs in an apparent display of disgust. The
local newspaper, apparently, reported the match result in the crime section.
It was this match that led to a rule change that the final pair of group matches in
the FIFA World Cup would thereafter be played simultaneously and, as far as we are
aware, this has (mostly) resolved this issue.
This match, which has since come to be known as the ‘Shame of Gijon’, is an
example of tacit collusion (Anderson et al., 2015; Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Choe
and Matsushima, 2013), which has some similarities with evolving cooperation in the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Li et al., 2011; Li and Kendall, 2014),
which has been an active field of research for over 30 years, and has strong links with
the pioneering work of Nash (1950, 1951) in Game Theory.
3.9.2. 31 August 1998 – Thailand vs Indonesia, 1998 AFF Championship
In the group stages, both Thailand and Indonesia were already certain of reaching
the semi–finals. The winner of the group would have to play the hosts Vietnam. The
second–placed team would play Singapore. The match against Singapore was seen as
the better option, so there was an incentive to lose. The score was 2–2 after 90 minutes
and in extra time Mursyid Effendi deliberately scored an own goal for Indonesia, giving
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Thailand a 3–2 victory24. FIFA fined both teams 40,000 USD for: ”violating the spirit
of the game”. Effendi was banned for a year from the domestic game and for life from
international duties.
3.9.3. 22 June 2004 – Denmark vs Sweden, Porto, Portugal
Just before the final group matches, in Group C of the 2004 UEFA Euro champi-
onship, the group table is shown in Table 6. The top two would go through to the
knock–out stages.
The most striking element is that both Sweden and Denmark beat Bulgaria and they
also drew against Italy. Whatever happened Bulgaria would be eliminated. Even if they
had beaten Italy, they would only be on three points and Sweden and Denmark would
go through. If Italy vs Bulgaria was a draw then neither would have gone through as
Italy would only be on three points – not enough to catch Sweden and Denmark.
The only result that could have affected who went through was if Italy had won
(giving them five points). It was natural to assume that this would happen as Italy
were considered a stronger team and had already drawn with Sweden and Denmark,
both of which had beaten Bulgaria. And, indeed, this is what happened, Italy beat
Bulgaria 2–1.
Analyzing the situation from the position of Sweden and Denmark, let us assume that
Italy would win, as any other result means that both Sweden and Denmark progress.
If either Sweden or Denmark had won the match between the two teams then the loser
would be eliminated as Italy would be on five points, as would Sweden (resp. Denmark)
with Denmark (resp. Sweden) being on four points.
Table 6: Group C table of UEFA Euro 2004 before the final matches in that group
Team Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts
Sweden 2 1 1 0 6 1 +5 4
Denmark 2 1 1 0 2 0 +2 4
Italy 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 2
Bulgaria 2 0 0 2 0 7 -7 0
The more interesting scenario is if Sweden and Denmark draw. The three teams will
be on five points. If we assume that they drew, with a scoreline of 2–2 (in fact, this was
the outcome), the final standings would be as shown in Table 7.
As three teams are on five points, there is a series of tie–break conditions25:
1. Greater number of points in the matches between the teams in question
As the three teams have all drawn with each other, the number of points will be
equal, so this tie–breaker does not separate them.
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Table 7: Group C table of the UEFA Euro 2004: Final standings
Team Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts
Sweden 3 1 2 0 8 3 +5 5
Denmark 3 1 2 0 4 2 +2 5
Italy 3 1 2 0 3 2 +1 5
Bulgaria 3 0 0 3 1 9 -8 0
2. Goal difference from matches between the teams in question
Again, as the teams had all drawn against each other, the goal difference will not
separate them
3. Greater number of goals scored in matches between the teams in question
The results of the three teams were Denmark 0–0 Italy; Italy 1–1 Sweden; Denmark
2–2 Sweden. Sweden had scored 3 goals, Denmark 2 and Italy 1. Under this tie–
break condition Italy were eliminated. It would have been interesting if Denmark
and Sweden had drawn 1–1. Then the goal totals would have been Sweden 2,
Denmark 1 and Italy 1 which would have meant that Denmark and Italy would
have had to be further separated. A 0–0 scoreline would have seen Italy and
Sweden progress.
4. Goal difference resulting from all three group games
5. Greater number of goals scored in all group games
6. Coefficient derived from UEFA EURO 2004 and FIFA 2002 World Cup qualifiers
(points obtained divided by number of matches played)
7. Fair Play ranking
8. Drawing of lots by the Committee for the European Championship, only applicable
if more than two teams are level
So, before the two matches took place, even though they were played at the same
time, Sweden and Denmark knew that a 2–2 would see them both progress and Italy
would be knocked out. Both teams denied any collusion, but the result caused a lot of
controversy.
Comments: Even though the rules changed after the Austria vs West Germany
match (see Section 3.9.1), playing the final matches at the same time still does not
guarantee that a given result may be beneficial for two teams playing in the same
match. A similar situation arose in Euro 2012, again involving Italy. They needed to
beat the Republic of Ireland to have any chance of progressing but if Croatia versus
Spain ended 2–2, then those two teams would progress. In fact, Italy won, Croatia lost
to Spain and Italy progressed. A further example is Chile vs Spain in the 2010 World
Cup.
It is difficult to see how these situations can be prevented. Perhaps one way would be
to use goal difference (as used in World Cup), as a tie–break rule, rather than the UEFA
tie–breaker ordering, although this may lead to further unintended consequences without
full analysis. It would be nice if all results could remain secret from the concerned teams,
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but that is impractical and would introduce its own problems (for example, a team that
is guaranteed to progress might want to rest some players).
Just looking at the list of tie–break criteria demonstrates the complexity of trying
to cater for every situation and even now, the final arbitrator is to draw lots.
It would be interesting to ask the academic community to propose tie–break rules,
which might be based around match statistics (or similar), but without subject to alter-
ing incentives that may serve to reduce the spectacle of the game (similar to the Lucas
Critique problem in economics).
3.9.4. 25 January 1994, Barbados vs Grenada
Qualifying for the 1994 Caribbean Cup, a regional tournament still in existence
today, involved a three–way single round–robin format. Only the top team progressed
to the tournament finals in Trinidad and Tobago. Before the final match in St. George’s,
between Barbados and Grenada, Table 8 shows the standings.
Table 8: Group 1 before the final qualifying match of the 1994 Caribbean Cup
Team Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts
Grenada 1 1 0 0 2 0 +2 3
Puerto Rico 2 1 0 1 1 2 -1 3
Barbados 1 0 0 1 0 1 -1 0
The mathematics were simple, Barbados needed to win by two goals to progress,
otherwise Grenada would advance. However, the qualifiers had a rule that each match
must have a winner, decided in sudden–death extra–time. The goal would count as two.
This supposedly simple rule would prove binding in five matches, but in this particular
case backfired spectacularly.
Late in the match, Barbados had the 2–0 lead they needed and began playing to
merely conserve this lead. Grenada then made it 2–1 in the 83rd minute, which was
sufficient for them, forcing Barbados to once again attack. Unable to conjure another
goal and with time fast running out, they realized that another (radical) course of action
was possible. They scored a deliberate own–goal, the rationale being that (assuming it
stayed at 2–2) extra–time would be necessitated, with the opportunity of an additional
30 minutes to score, and in which one goal would both put them two ahead and end the
match instantly.
In the final few minutes of regulation time, the state of the match deteriorated
even further. The Grenada players quickly worked out that their best response was
to score a goal, at either end. This would either win the game or lose by one but at
least avoid extra–time. To this end, they headed straight for their own net from the
re–start. However, the Barbadians had already anticipated this, so half their players
began defending the Grenada goal while the others defended their own. They succeeded
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in preserving the 2–2 score line at the whistle, and then proceeded to score the winner
in the 94th minute, demonstrating a masterclass in perverse–rule exploitation.
FIFA did not penalize the Barbados Federation given that they were striving for the
best outcome conditional upon the prevailing rules. Understandably, this rule was never
used again.
Comments: Whilst, perhaps, not being obvious when the rule was introduced to
motivate the winning of close matches there might have been some benefit in spending
some time running through scenarios that may play out. The obvious (in hindsight)
cases that need to be considered are those matches that are close, and which have the
potential to have an effect as to whether one of the teams progress or not.
Of course, it is easy to make these type of judgments in hindsight but one wonders
how much consultation was carried out and whether the scientific community was asked
to comment, perhaps even running simulations to see if any unanticipated effects could
arise.
3.9.5. Red and Yellow Cards
Most football fans would agree that the current yellow/red card sanction system
(coupled with penalties) generally does a good job of applying discipline for on–field
indiscretions in a uniform and simple manner.
A quarter–final World Cup match between Uruguay v Ghana on 2 July 201026 showed
that it is not without its shortcomings.
Luis Sua´rez demonstrated that a shamelessly indiscriminate (and some would argue
unsportsmanlike) foul is still worth conceding a penalty and a red card. Late in extra
time, with the score at 1–1, Sua´rez, knowing full well that he would get sent off, instinc-
tively saved the ball (with his hand) on the goal line, preventing an otherwise certain
goal27.
In a way it was a totally rational action, because Uruguay would almost certainly be
eliminated if he had let the ball go into the net. However, his intervention, even with
a man down, meant that if Gyan missed the resulting penalty (which he did), then the
contest reverted back to a virtually 50–50 proposition, with penalties being a strong
possibility.
Uruguay won the shoot–out 4–2, and despite being without Sua´rez, they gave the
Netherlands a good contest in the semi–final.
Comments: Sua´rez’s actions feel very unsportsmanlike, especially for neutral fans.
Thierry Henry in an earlier 2010 World Cup UEFA Qualifying playoff at least appeared
contrite in the aftermath after a blatant playoff–deciding handball against the Republic
of Ireland28.
We would note that not all red and yellow cards are equal. This one had a profound
effect on the match, another one (a mistimed tackle late in a match, which had no real
consequence) is not as equal. Perhaps the penalties (fine, match bans etc.) should be
decided by a panel after the match taking into account the state of the match at the
time the offense was committed.
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3.9.6. Automatic Qualification for FIFA World Cup
Until the 2002 World Cup, the reigning champion was granted automatic qualifica-
tion for the finals in the next World Cup (as a caveat, Uruguay chose not to participate
in 1934). However, the unintended consequence is that this often proved to be more
of a curse than a blessing for the reigning champions, which often performed below
expectations in the finals. For example:
1. Brazil – 1974: Brazil drew the opening match against Yugoslavia, drew the
second match against Scotland before beating Zaire in the final group match.
This was enough for Brazil to finish in second place and so progressed to the
second round of group matches. Brazil lost to the Netherlands before beating
East Germany and Argentina. Finishing second in the group, Brazil contested the
third place play–off against Poland, losing that match 0–1.
2. Argentina – 1982: Argentina lost the opening match to Belgium, winning the
next two matches. They finished second in their group. In the second round of
group matches, Argentina were beaten by both Italy and Brazil, finishing at the
bottom of the group with zero points and a -3 goal difference.
3. Germany – 1994: In the first round of group matches, Germany won two games
and drew one. This was enough to top the group. In the knockout stages (note,
this is a different format to the previously reported tournaments), Germany beat
Belgium but then lost to Bulgaria in the quarter–finals.
4. France – 2002: In the first round of group matches, France lost two games and
drew one, finishing bottom of the group and France’s World Cup defence was over.
This rule has now been rescinded (along with pressure by confederations to open
up an extra regional qualifying spot). Since then, no reigning champion has failed to
qualify for the finals, although Italy performed poorly in the 2010 finals, as did Spain
in 2014.
3.9.7. Penalty Shoot–outs
It is recognised, though not without dispute (Kocher et al., 2012), that the team
shooting first in a penalty shoot–out wins significantly more than 50% of the time. This
is consistent with serving first in tennis (Magnus and Klaassen, 1999) although, unlike
best–of–three sets in tennis, you do not have the luxury of being able to shoot first in
the next game.
Palacios-Huerta (2014) devotes an entire chapter to the 1988–89 season of the Ar-
gentinian League, in which there existed an unusual points system. All drawn matches
went to penalties (no extra–time), with the shoot–out winners getting two points, and
the losers one point29. He finds that when players are subjected to shoot–outs in com-
petitive situations much more often than usual, the first–taker advantage disappears.
It would be interesting to replicate this study for the 1993–94 Australian domestic sea-
son, where something similar applied (except four points for a win to effectively reward
regular–time wins)30.
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Comments: There is an interesting unpublished paper (Anbarci et al., 2015) that
considers FIFA penalty shootouts. They note that the team that takes the first penalty
is decided by a coin toss, and that this team is more likely to win. A fairer mechanism is
proposed based on the Thue–Morse sequence. This does not follow a strict alternating
sequence but the team that is behind takes the next penalty. It is noted that this
principle is used in the standard rules of Petanque (Boules) and could also be used in
other sports such as ice hockey, water polo and handball. It would be interesting to
experiment with this idea in a live situation.
3.9.8. The Offside Rule
The laws of Association Football were written in 1863 (Taylor, 2008), when the
Football Association (FA) was formed in London at a meeting in the Freemasons’ Tavern.
Although there are other important dates in the history of the game, this is the time
when most would agree that the formalization of the rules (and establishing of the FA)
is probably the most important landmark.
Law 11 of Association Football31 defines the offside rule.
The Football Association in the UK provide worked examples of the offside law, by
way of an interpretation document32 and FIFA provides guidelines to officials about how
to interpret the law33.
The rationale behind the offside rule is to stop players goal hanging. That is, staying
in the opponents half, typically near the goal. When a player is passed the ball, the
receiving player must have two of the opposing players between themselves and the goal
(it used to be three opposing players until the 1920s, and even earlier it was the whole
team). This is typically the goalkeeper and a defender. This enables the defending side
to push out so that the attacking players must retreat back up the field to remain onside.
Complications arise as a player can only be offside when the ball is played. So if they
time their run correctly, so that they are onside at the time the ball is played, then by
the time they receive the ball they may have run many yards past the defender so that
they now appear to be offside. To accurately capture whether the player was onside or
offside, requires one of the officials (typically the assistant referee) to keep up with play
and be in a position to accurately judge whether the attacking player was onside when
the pass was made.
Of course, pundits have the benefit of slow (and stop) motion replay and computer
technology that can place straight lines across the pitch which is usually able to show
whether the correct decision has been made by the officials.
However, this aspect of the rule almost fails into insignificance when one considers
whether a player, who is in an offside position is interfering with play. The offside rule
states:
A player in an offside position is only penalized if, at the moment the ball touches
or is played by one of his team, he is, in the opinion of the referee, involved in active
play by:
1. interfering with play or
2. interfering with an opponent or
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3. gaining an advantage by being in that position
Watch almost any football program and the TV pundits will debate whether a player
was interfering with play. There is almost as much discussion as to whether a player,
who is on the pitch, can be considered as interfering with play or not, and how can any
player not be interfering with play.
Bill Shankly (Liverpool Manager, 1959–1974), commented on the offside rule by
saying, “If a player is not interfering with play or seeking to gain an advantage, then he
should be.”
Sweden vs Denmark, 10 August 1948, Summer Olympic Semi–Final In
the 1948 Olympic’s semi–final Sweden played Denmark. On a counter attack, Sweden’s
Gunnar Nordahl realised that he had strayed into an offside position. He removed
himself from play by throwing himself into Denmark’s goal, no longer being in an offside
position. When teammate Henry Carlsson headed a goal a moment later, he even caught
the ball before it hit the net34.
Other Olympic examples can be seen in Sections 3.1, 3.3.1 and 3.8.1.
Bulgaria vs Germany, 10 July 1994, World Cup USA 94 Quarter–Final
A match in the 1994 World Cup between Bulgaria and Germany starkly shows the
controversy between a player interfering with play and not interfering with play. A
goal by Rudi Vo¨ller was, correctly, disallowed by the referee, because he had been in a
(passive) offside position a second earlier when teammate Andres Mo¨ller shot on goal,
but since the shot would rebound off the post straight back to Vo¨ller, he was ruled
retrospectively offside. If the original shot had gone into the goal, it would have stood35.
Comments The offside rule is often the cause of confusion and controversy. It would
be interesting to see the effect of abandoning the rule but this is likely to lead to a long
ball game and at least one attacking player goal hanging, just waiting for the ball to
arrive. This would inevitably lead to more defenders having to camp in the penalty
area, staying close to the attackers. Overall, abandoning the offside rule would lead to
a much more negative game.
Some experiments have been undertaken to try different versions of the offside rule.
One experiment36, carried out in the 1973–74 and 1974–75 Scottish League Cup and
Drybrough Cup, extended the penalty area line to meet the touch lines, creating a solid
line across the pitch 18 yards from each goal. A player could only be offside when inside
this area. The experiment was dropped after the 1974–75 season.
In the 1987–88 Football Conference season the offside rule was changed so that no
player could be offside from a free kick37 (footnote37 also has some other interesting
rule changes that were tested). This rule change led to most free kicks resulting in the
attacking team all heading into the penalty area, with the ball launched into the sea of
attackers and defenders near the goal. The experiment was dropped after a few weeks.
The rule has again, recently, been updated38, and there is a very nice commentary
from a former referee that explains what the changes mean.
Some would argue that the offside rule adds a tactical dimension to the game. De-
fenders have to be much more coordinated if they wish to lay an offside trap by the
defender(s) pushing up the field at the right moment so that an attacking player is in an
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offside position just before the ball is played to them. Attackers can also show their skills
by timing their runs just right to coincide with midfield players (typically) threading a
pass, into the path of a player who has just made their run.
The authors would argue that there is some room for improvement in the rule. Taking
our lead from Bill Shankly, we would suggest that any player who is participating in
the game can be in an offside position, doing away with any argument about whether a
player is interfering with play. To mis–quote Bill Shankly we would argue: “If a player is
not interfering with play then what are they doing on the pitch?” Even, if they are tying
a boot lace, somebody from the opposing team has to keep an eye on them. Moreover,
the Bulgaria vs Germany match (Section 3.9.8) shows that a player not interfering with
play one second, certainly can be very soon after. It seems a little unfair on referees
having to make these split–second decisions in what is already a tense situation.
However, there are counter arguments to this view. One such example39 is given
by Robert Evans, a qualified referee since 1964, who makes some very relevant points,
for example should somebody who takes a corner be offside immediately and what does
seeking an advantage actually mean? The match that Evans refers to in his article is
available on Youtube40 (see approximately 3 mins, 30 secs), with a discussion on the
offside decision being available at askasoccerreferee41.
In our view the offside rule is still far from clear.
3.9.9. Golden Goals
The introduction of sudden–death extra–time (FIFA tried to spin a positive/attacking
connotation on it by marketing it as the Golden Goal) was supposed to reduce the in-
cidence of knock–out phase matches going to a penalty shoot–out, as (all other things
equal) when a goal (the first) in extra–time was scored, it would deny the team that
fell behind in extra–time the subsequent opportunity to equalize, and by extension,
the probability that the match would still proceed to a shoot–out. However, while it
sounded nice in theory, in a textbook error, FIFA neglected to consider the incentive
effects. In denying the opportunity for an equalizer, you also increase the opportunity
cost of attacking and conceding a sucker–punch goal, insofar that now that the team
no longer gets a chance to equalize. Subsequently, the data showed that this defensive
effect ended up overwhelming the positive effect that was evident previously, and not
only did extra–time scoring decrease, but the frequency of shoot–outs increased. Brocas
and Carrillo (2004) shows how this happened (they also independently look at the effect
of the 3–points–for–a–win system). UEFA subsequently experimented with the weaker
Silver Goal (the team leading after the first fifteen–minute half would win), but it did
not improve the incentives much, so eventually FIFA abandoned the rule and returned
to the previous rule.
As mentioned in related work (Section 2), Lenten et al. (2013) suggests that penalties
should be taken before extra–time. That would give the necessary incentives (for at least
one team) to attack in extra–time.
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3.9.10. Full Replays for Draws
Sometimes a result is required (e.g. in a knockout competition). Until 1991, FA Cup
ties were based on unlimited replays (until one team won). In 1975, Fulham played 12
games over six rounds to reach the final, a record which stands to this day. Replays
used to be played 3–4 days after the original game, but from 1991-92, this was changed
to 10 days, following police advice. This ultimately led to the introduction of penalty
shoot–outs if the replay is still level after extra–time.
Playing full replays is inconvenient for a number of reasons, with the most obvious
being that it can lead to fixture congestion.
Ultimately, there has to be some way of resolving the situation and in the 1968 Euro
semi–final between Italy and the USSR, the score was 0–0 after extra time. The winner
(Italy) was decided by the toss of a coin, which we suspect, most fans would find a
disappointing end to a match.
Possibly, even worse, Turkey qualified for the 1954 World Cup via the drawing of
lots after finishing on the same number of points as Spain. A deciding match between
the two teams ended in a draw (including extra time), and the drawing of lots went to
Turkey. What makes this even more unpalatable is the fact that Spain had a superior
goal difference and had beaten Turkey 4–1 in their home fixture, whilst Turkey had only
beaten Spain 1–0 in their home fixture.
Of course, there are advantages with a full–replay system, with the major one being
extra ticket sales, leading to an unexpected financial windfall.
3.9.11. Fergie Time
Fergie time is the so–called extra time bias that is enjoyed by Manchester United,
who (perhaps to the biased fan) tend to get more injury time when they needed to score
a goal. Fergie is a reference to Manchester United’s long–serving manager, Sir Alex
Ferguson, who managed Manchester United for 27 years (1986 to 2013).
In the mid–1990’s, FIFA compelled match officials to reveal (approximately) how
many additional minutes would be played at the start of injury time. This enabled a
natural experiment of home bias in referee’s decisions, comparing the revealed minutes
with the actual length of play at the referee’s final whistle. In some ways, it is a better
test of referee home bias than looking at more standard metrics, such as the number of
fouls, as there are potentially numerous selection biases that could explain why away
teams commit more fouls than home teams, without a bias being present.
The rule change allowed a comparison showing whether large–market teams benefit
more from this Fergie time bias than small–market teams. Broadly, the evidence shows
that biases do indeed exist, though it is somewhat mixed. Garicano et al. (2005) finds
that “professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in
the stadium. We find that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close
games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team
is behind.”
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3.9.12. Etiquette
Etiquette is not a law that has to be respected, but is another example of tacit
cooperation – both sides have an unwritten contract to respect the etiquette. Some
breaches are more serious than others. Not to show new balls to an opponent in tennis
is probably not that serious. To deliver a punch, rather than shake hands (or at least
touch gloves), at the start of the final round in a boxing match might be viewed more
seriously. To break the laws of etiquette does not break the laws of the game but some
would see it as being equally as bad, or even worse, as it is also a breach of trust.
In football, it is quite normal that a player will kick the ball into touch so that an
injured player (even an opposing player) can receive treatment. When play resumes,
the person taking the throw in will return the ball to the opposing team. To do this is
not a law of the game, but is observed widely, if albeit not universally.
On 13 February 1999, Arsenal were playing Sheffield United in the FA Cup fifth
round. With the score at 1–1, a Sheffield player (Lee Morris) went down injured and the
ball was put out of play by the United goalkeeper. When play resumed Ray Parlour took
the throw–in, throwing it towards the United end. However, Arsenal’s Nwankwo Kanu
intercepted the throw and passed the ball to Marc Overmars who knocked it into the
net, to score the winning goal42. Sheffield United’s players, were naturally very upset,
but the referee had to award the goal. Kanu’s defence was that it was his first game
in England and he misunderstood the situation. Arsenal’s manager, Arse`ne Wenger,
contacted his counterpart (Steve Bruce) and offered to replay the game. The FA raised
no objections so the match was voided, with Arsenal winning the rescheduled match.
On 8 August 2015, Doncaster were playing Bury in a League One fixture. After
an injury, a throw–in was given to a Doncaster player, who lobbed in back to the Bury
goalkeeper, but the ball bounced over the goalkeeper’s head and went into the goal. The
referee had to let the goal stand. The two teams conferred and Bury were allowed to
score an unopposed walk–in from the kick off43.
Comments In both these incidents, there could have been unintended consequences.
For example, some goalkeepers have a clean–sheet bonus in their contracts and goals
from these type of incidents could spoil that record. It could also affect league standings
at the end of the season, if two teams are on the same number of points and the final
league position is decided by goal difference or by goals scored. Of course, it could work
to the advantage of one of the teams and, perhaps, disadvantage another team who was
not involved in the original incident.
Perhaps there is an argument that a referee should have the discretion to disallow
a goal for reasons of etiquette (should both captains agree), although this, in itself, is
likely to lead to controversial incidents.
We would also note that etiquette could also be seen as good sportsmanship, although
there might be subtle distinctions. Etiquette is a set of unwritten, but widely accepted,
rules which even unsportsmanlike athletes still subscribe to due to peer pressure. Being
a good sportsman is more about an attitude and wanting to play all aspects of the
games in a fair way. Another area which we would argue is different to etiquette is fair
play. This can be defined as “doing anything morally ‘wrong’ to gain an advantage to
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win.” This could be categorized as acceptable (e.g. negative or dour/defensive tactics
but playing within the spirit of the game), unacceptable and against the spirit of the
game, although ‘legal’ (e.g. sledging), and against the rules (e.g. doping, sabotaging an
opponent).
3.10. Formula One
In the 2016 Australian Grand Prix, the qualifying system was criticized after rule
changes were introduced, governing the use of tyres44. The Independent newspaper
reported “The one–hour session will be remembered as a farce with no cars on track in
the final minutes of the knockout session, leading Mercedes boss Toto Wolff to describe
it as ‘rubbish’.”45. The incident happened as one of the teams decided to save their
tyres for the main race. Other teams followed their lead, which led to fans staring at an
empty track for the final few minutes.
Mercede’s Toto Wolff is reported as saying “I think the new qualifying format is
pretty rubbish. We need to discuss it. Everyone is trying to do their best to improve the
show and if we haven’t we need to discuss it. The solution is not good in my opinion
and that is why we have to look at it again.”
3.11. Hockey
3.11.1. NHL Points System/Scoring
From 1983–84, the NHL used to have ties if overtime failed to separate the teams,
with two points for a win, one for a tie, and zero for a loss. From 1999–2000, that was
changed such that the overtime loser was then awarded one point. From 2005–2006, a
skater came off from each side, leaving it 4–on–4. This opens up the field increasing the
likelihood of scoring. As of the 2015–16 season, it is now 3–on–3. For years, ties had
been becoming more frequent, and administrators felt that this measure would provide
an incentive to prevent defensive play in overtime; but the incentive–effect of this change
proved to be two–fold. It (largely unforeseen) perversely encouraged more defensive play
in the final few minutes of matches in which the scores were level, as both teams knew
if it stayed that way until the end of regulation time, the joint reward would ultimately
improve from two points to three points, regardless of what happened subsequently.
Following the ‘lockout’ season, since 2005–06, if a game was not decided in overtime, a
(kind of) penalty shootout would determine the winner (still with a 2–1 split). Abrevaya
(2004) is one the papers that investigates this rule change, noting that “the rule change
had the desired effect of increasing excitement during overtime play. This article shows,
however, that the rule also had the effect of increasing the frequency of overtime games,
an effect predictable from the change in incentives but one not intended by the league.”
The NHL persists with that competition points system.
NHL is also discussed in Section 4.1, item 1.
3.11.2. Tanking in Hockey
In the 2015 IIHF Ice Hockey World Championship, Finland and Russia were both
through to the quarter–finals. The loser of this game would stay in Ostrava and play
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Sweden, whereas the winner had to travel to Prague to play the hosts (Czech Republic).
Apparently, it was clear to everyone watching the match exactly which alternative was
preferred by both teams. Neither authors know enough about Ice Hockey to offer a
strong opinion but the highlights are available on Youtube46, so that more knowledgeable
readers can form their own opinion. Tanking in other sports is discussed in Sections
3.3.1, 3.6, 3.12.2 and 4.1 (Point 1).
3.12. Tennis
3.12.1. Challenging Your Own Serve in Tennis
The final of the Australian Open (29 January 2012) was between Novak Djokovic
and Rafael Nadal. It was an excellent match, that will be remembered by tennis fans for
many reasons. However, there was a strange incident that did not change the outcome
of the match, but a similar incident could do so in different circumstances.
Nadal challenged the validity of one of his own serves. The serve was judged to be
in, but Nadal questioned whether it was out. The Hawkeye system showed that the ball
was only just in, so the point, as played, stood.
Why does this matter? When Nadal served, Djokovic hit a winning return. If the
challenge had been upheld (i.e. the ball was called out) then the server would get a
second serve and may win the point. At a more critical point in the match, this could
have had significant consequences.
There are other examples of this47 and even examples where it has been successful48.
Comments: At first sight it appears questionable whether you should allow a
challenge to be made by a server when they are given the decision they would normally
desire. If the serve was an ace, or they thought that they would win the point, they
would be unlikely to challenge the serve. The problem is that if a winning return is
made, the server can always argue that they had no time before the return to make the
challenge, so they can only challenge at that point – with the benefit of hindsight.
No doubt the authorities have considered this rule but for it to be changed, requires
an actual case where this occurs on a critical point, such as a match point, where the
server challenges, it is upheld and goes onto win the match. We suppose that the counter
argument is that under these conditions, the server does deserve a second serve.
One suggestion is that the players have to decide before the match whether they want
all of their serves scrutinized by Hawkeye and if a first serve is in, but called incorrectly,
then the server has to take a second serve. However, we suspect that this would be too
cumbersome to implement.
Researchers have started to look at optimal challenge strategies (Clarke and Norman,
2012; Abramitzky et al., 2012) as competitors get more used to them, and they seem to
be used in more sports.
3.12.2. Tanking in Tennis
There is potential for tanking story in tennis. The following incident relates to the
ATP/WTA ‘Lucky Loser’ rule: “A lucky loser is a sports player who loses a match in
the qualifying round of a knockout tournament, but who then enters the main draw when
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another player withdraws after the tournament has started because of illness, injury or
other reason”.
The lucky loser then enters the main draw, normally in place of the withdrawn
player. This can only happen before all players in the main draw have started their first
match in the tournament. In tennis, the traditional rule for choosing a player to enter
the main draw as a lucky loser is as follows.
From all players eliminated in the final round of qualifying, the highest–ranked player
in the ATP or WTA rankings is the first one to enter the draw, followed by the second
highest–ranked player and so on (if more players withdrew before the start of the tour-
nament). On rare occasions when there are more late withdrawals than losers in the last
qualifying rounds, or players eligible for lucky losers are not available, a player who lost
in the penultimate round of qualifying may qualify as a lucky loser. Prior to the 2005
Wimbledon Championships, American player Justin Gimelstob faced George Bastl from
Switzerland in the final qualification round. Gimelstob, who was the highest–ranked
player remaining in the qualifying tournament, aggravated a chronic back complaint
during his second qualification match against Vladimir Voltchkov. Gimelstob planned
to withdraw before the match with Bastl, and informed his opponent of his intent. How-
ever, officials suggested that Gimelstob play at least one game, as it was almost certain
someone would withdraw from the main draw before the tournament started, giving
Gimelstob a good chance of getting a lucky loser place, as well as giving him time for
his back to recover.
Gimelstob did indeed enter the main draw as a lucky loser after the withdrawal of
Andre Agassi, reaching the third round, where he lost to Lleyton Hewitt. While Gimel-
stob’s behavior was not generally considered unethical, it raised concerns by pointing
out that any player in a similar position would have little incentive to play a competitive
match. For example, a high–ranking player paired against a lower–ranked friend might
deliberately lose the match to help his friend gain entry to the tournament, if the first
player had already been given a lucky loser spot. The possibility of bribery was also a
concern.
Shortly after, a new policy was introduced in Grand Slam tournaments. Since 2006,
the four highest ranked players who lose in the last round of qualification take part in
a four–way random draw, the results of which are used to determine the order in which
each player will enter the main draw. Consequently, if only one main draw spot for a
lucky loser is available, the highest–ranked loser has just a 25% chance of entering the
draw, instead of 100% as previously. This element of uncertainty helps to ensure that
final–round qualifying matches remain competitive. However, this rule does not apply
in all other tournaments.
Fortunately, due to this minor incident, the administrators foresaw the scope for a
major incident and changed the rule before a major incident could occur.
Tanking in other sports is discussed in Sections 3.3.1, 3.6, 3.11.2 and 4.1 (Point 1).
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3.13. National Football League: NFL
3.13.1. NFL Overtime/Scoring
The NFL has had (single) sudden–death overtime for drawn/tied matches since 1974,
extending further (if necessary) for playoff matches. It had long been found however,
that winning the toss to get first possession (by forcing the opposition to kick–off),
means that the winner of the toss ends up winning the match nearly 60% of the time.
Wanting the toss to have less influence, the NFL altered the rule so that if Team A
scores a field goal on their first possession, Team B now gets one possession themselves
to at least match Team A’s score, with overtime continuing if team B also scores a field
goal. The rule has not yet been binding on a sufficient number of occasions to make
reliable inference on its performance.
Related to this scenario, Che and Hendershott (2008) suggested a Yardage Auction
to overcome the same problem. Despite being an interesting idea, it is unlikely that
the League administrators would adopt it for aesthetic, mechanical, and/or operational
reasons.
3.14. Rugby
3.14.1. National Rugby League: Golden Point
Similar to both to the NFL (see Section 3.13.1) and the Golden Goal (see Section
3.9.9, the National Rugby League (NRL, Australia’s elite Rugby League competition)
introduced a sudden–death extra–time in 200349. As at 1 April 2016, of the 92 matches
that have gone to extra–time (including the 2015 Grand Final), 79 were decided by a
Golden Point, thus reducing the frequency of draws by more than 85%. However, of
more contention is how teams tend to play extra–time. Many of these contests are dry
and methodical, typically with both teams angling a field goal (worth only one point) as
their scoring method of first choice. Of the 79 matches decided, 52 (almost two–thirds)
were won with a field goal, with 18 via a try and nine by way of a penalty goal. We
cannot recall any discussion about the winning of the toss angle (as in the NFL), but it
would not be a surprise if the figures bear that out.
3.14.2. Rugby (Union) Bonus Points
In the 2012 Rugby Championship, game 1, Australia were playing New Zealand
(Sydney, 18 August)50. The match is available on Youtube51 (see approximately, 1
hour, 43 minutes). At 19–24 down, on the stroke of full–time, Australia conceded a
penalty close to the New Zealand try line. If bonus points did not exist, New Zealand
would likely simply kick the ball into touch to finish the game. If they took the penalty
attempt, there would be the chance that it rebounded off the post back into general
play, from which Australia could have run it down to the other end for a (converted) try
and steal the game. However, with bonus points, New Zealand skipper Richie McCaw
decided that the albeit minimal risk was worth taking. By converting the penalty (which
would be the very last play), the final score would be 19–27, thus Australia would be
denied the (narrow–loss) bonus point; which in the context of the tournament might
have proved later to be useful. Dan Carter converted the kick, and indeed the New
Zealand decision proved to be the correct one.
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3.14.3. 1995 National Provincial Championship, Otago vs Auckland
In 1995, in a National Provincial Championship game, Auckland were leading Otago
by seven points. Towards the end of the game Otago were awarded a penalty close to
Auckland’s goal line. The narrow–loss bonus was awarded for losing by six, or fewer,
points. With this in mind, rather than go for a try/conversion in order to draw the
game, Otago decided to take a penalty kick (which was successful).
From an expected–points perspective this was the right thing to do, but from a rules
points of view, it is interesting to note that they were encouraged to accept a loss, rather
than try for a draw. We suspect that this rule was designed to encourage teams that
are behind to try harder towards the latter end of the game, and so maintain spectator
interest.
4. Examples From Multiple Sports
4.1. Salary Caps and Player Drafts
The two main policy tools that the big–four ‘Major Leagues’ in North American
(and Australian) sports use to try to enhance competitive balance (and also, keep play-
ers’ wages low) are the salary cap and player drafts. Their collective effectiveness on
competitive balance is debatable, but these policies can sometimes incentive perverse
behavior. We present some of these below.
1. With player drafts, the traditional set–up is reverse order, so as to supposedly
maximize the potential of its otherwise randomness to even up the competition
over time, as cellar–dwellers are advantaged. Quoting from Lenten (2016) “...
allocate the first pick from the talent pool to the team with the least amount of
talent, providing it with the best opportunity to improve its rank in subsequent
seasons.”
This creates a perverse incentive for some teams to ‘tank’ once they are eliminated
from contention, because “...losing is linked to the prospect of a higher–order pick
from the annual pool of available and/or emerging talent. The perverse incentives
are at their strongest during the latter stages of the regular season for teams that
already face a weakened win–incentive following expiration of playoff qualification
likelihood.”
The tanking problem is discussed in all the major US/Canadian sports, with it
anecdotally being at its most acute in the NBA, which (quoting from Lenten
(2015)): “...introduced a ‘lottery’ system the top pick is drawn randomly, with
probabilities weighted progressively towards lower–ranked teams in 1984 (the NHL,...,
followed suit in 2007), weakening the negative correlation between final rank and
pick order.”
The lottery probability structure has been changed a few times since, see Price
et al. (2010).
Despite perennial accusations of NBA teams tanking, we cannot find a single case
of a team being charged as such. In fact, the only case we could find was again
in the AFL; a scandal involving Melbourne on the basis of matches in 2007 and
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2009, though it worth noting that they were not charged formally with ‘tanking’
(there was not enough evidence for this), but rather for ‘bringing the game into
disrepute’, and so were the then–Coach (now deceased) and his Assistant Coach52.
It is also worth noting in this case, the exact nature of the Melbourne games had
to do not with purely the reverse–order draft, but rather a ‘priority pick’, an AFL
draft nuance that provides a further layer of perverse incentive to tank53.
Details of a specific match, also involving Melbourne, but not part of the scandal
itself is presented here. Ironically, they won this game, but principally because
the other team had an even stronger incentive to tank.
2 September 2007 (Round 22) MCG Melbourne v Carlton54.
The Round 22, 2007 match between Melbourne and Carlton, nicknamed the
‘Kreuzer Cup’, was the most controversial match in the tanking debate. It was the
last match of the year, and both Melbourne and Carlton had a record of 4–0–17
(W–D–L), meaning that whichever team won the match would lose the chance
at a priority draft pick, and both clubs had already avoided the ignominy of the
wooden spoon, as Richmond had already secured it with a final record of 3–1–18.
This meant that there was no benefit for either club to win, but a significant
benefit in losing. The stakes were particularly high in Carlton’s case, because the
club had also received a priority pick in the 2006 season. As such, if it lost this
match, it would receive the No. 1 draft pick as its priority pick. In Melbourne’s
case, the priority pick it could have received would be the No. 18 pick; the No.
1 pick would go to Richmond if Melbourne lost the match. The match became
known as the Kreuzer Cup, named after Northern Knights’ ruckman Matthew
Kreuzer, who had been expected to be selected with the No. 1 pick in the 2007
AFL Draft. The match was high scoring, played with low intensity, poor skills
and very little defensive pressure, and two players (Carlton’s Heath Scotland and
Melbourne’s Travis Johnstone) gathered more than 40 disposals. In addition, the
crowd of 26,156 was subdued, and there were reports of fans openly supporting
the opponents. In the end, Melbourne had a five goal lead by quarter time, and
ended up winning 21.13 (139) to 15.18 (108). Carlton went on to recruit Kreuzer
with the No. 1 pick in the draft.
The only footage we could find of the game is from a chat show several years later
(the whole clip is interesting, but the game footage is from about 3:45–4:20)55.
Tanking in other sports is discussed in Sections 3.3.1, 3.6, 3.11.2 and 3.12.2.
2. With salary caps, apart from the economic problems it brings (that the allocation
of players is not optimal, and that star players and large–market teams both have
incentives to get around it), the more specific problem is that it is there to be
cheated, especially when it is a ‘hard’ salary cap. As an example, salary cap
breaches were in force in the NRL (National Rugby League in Australia) in 2010,
when Melbourne Storm had two past titles (2007 and 2009) stripped, plus other
penalties56.
This followed another, not quite as significant, breach by Canterbury-Bankstown
in 2002 in which they were stripped of all their points in the current season and
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finished bottom57.
In the same year, the AFL (Australian Football League) also experienced its salary
cap cheating scandal, involving Carlton (who have seemingly still not yet recovered
from it).
Comprehensive lists of NRL and AFL breaches (mostly minor) are available58 59.
The main difference between the leagues is that since the AFL also has a draft
(unlike the NRL), the penalties tend to focus on stripping draft picks (which are
forward–looking), whereas the NRL do not have that penalty at their disposal,
thus stripping of points (which is backward–looking) is their penalty of choice.
Tanking in other sports is discussed in Sections 3.3.1, 3.6, 3.11.2 and 3.12.2.
4.2. Tournament Formats
1. Similar to appeasing India in cricket (see Section 3.7.4), the Rugby World Cup has
an unusual number of competing teams (20). Why 20? We suspect that adding
an extra four teams, from the 1999 competition, means that there is a justification
for an extra place going to the Americas, which in turn means almost certain
qualification for the USA. Is this an example of economic factors being given more
weight than the ‘optimal’ number of teams?
2. Managing the tournament design for economic incentives is part of FIFA’s strategy,
above and beyond gifting World Cup hosting rights to countries with no previous
pedigree, such as USA, Japan and Qatar – although the argument would be made
that this is to give opportunity to countries with potential/aspiration.
It is recognized that FIFA often changes its system to determine the seven (ex-
cluding the hosts) group seeds for each tournament, with 2010 and 2014 being
exceptions. In those years the seedings were done by considering the most recent
rankings.
Choosing a ‘system’ that FIFA openly reports, to give it legitimacy, is often seen as
being chosen to provide seedings to as many as possible of the big media markets,
so that they are not drawn in the same group.
For example, the 2006 system seems overly complex for something that should
appear to be reasonably simple60. A similar system had been used in 200261, but
with subtly different weightings.
There was some controversy before the 2014 World Cup draw, when FIFA decided
upon their allocation of the draw pots. Only eight teams were seeded; the hosts
(Brazil) and the seven sides ranked highest in the October 2013 FIFA World Rank-
ings (Spain, Germany, Argentina, Columbia, Belgium, Uruguay and Switzerland).
The remaining teams were allocated to three pots based on their geographical lo-
cation. However, there were still nine unseeded European sides. This meant that
one European side had to be allocated to Pot 2, comprising of African and South
American sides. FIFA decided that the European team in Pot 2 would be chosen
randomly (which turned out to be Italy) from those in Pot 4.
Many assumed, based on a 2006 precedent, that it would be France that would be
moved, and not a random choice. This assumption was based on France being the
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lowest–ranked European side in the October 2013 FIFA World Rankings, which
was used to determine the eight seeded sides.
Many officials, fans and journalists complained, pointing out that a Frenchman, the
FIFA secretary–general Je´roˆme Valcke, had suggested the change, also suspecting
that another influential Frenchman, UEFA’s president Michel Platini, had helped
it get approved. The next day, a headline in the Italian sports periodical Corriere
dello Sport read “2014 World Cup draw: What a scandal!”.
A similar situation arose with the 2006 seeding. On that occasion the lowest–
ranked European side (Serbia and Montenegro) were placed in the alternative
pot.
3. The Davis Cup until 1972 had a curious design, called the ‘challenge’ system, in
which the reigning champion went straight into the Final the following year with
home–court advantage. This is antiquated by the standards in modern professional
tennis and numerous other sports, although systems like this still exist in sports
such as Chess.
4. In the Sheffield Shield, they have recently re–introduced a ‘bonus point’ system62.
Compared to the previous system, it favors teams that play the game ‘quicker’;
higher batting run rates and lower bowling strike rates. This (arguably unfairly)
favors Western Australia, which plays on its traditionally hard and bouncy pitch.
A previous bonus point system existed throughout the 1970s, a period in which
Western Australia dominated. This domination continued after the points system
was reformed, right up until the early 1990s, when all the other teams finally
adjusted to more attacking tactics, in line with the incentives inherent in the
competition points system. We suspect that this also resulted in the Australian
team itself becoming a lot more attacking from the mid–1990s onwards.
5. Under the North American conference and divisional system, it is well known (and
accepted) that some teams qualify for the playoffs ahead of other teams that have
actually won more matches (or accumulated more points). In some rugby (and
cricket) tournaments, this is also possible due to the existence of bonus points.
One further curiosity lies in the Scottish Professional Football League (SPFL) since
2000–01, whereby this can also happen, but by virtue of an idiosyncrasy seldom
seen elsewhere. Specifically, the table is ‘split’ into its top and bottom halves after
three full round–robins, and then no crossover is allowed in the last five rounds of
matches. In a number of seasons, some teams finish above other teams that have
more points. In the 2002–03 season, seventh and eighth both accumulated more
points than the teams that finished fifth and sixth63.
5. Conclusion
The vast majority of people probably think that the rules that govern the major
sports are fairly static, with changes only being rarely made. It is the case that many
sports rarely change their rules, but many others are under constant development and
that the changes sometimes lead to unintended consequences. Indeed, even long estab-
lished rules can sometimes still have undesirable effects.
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Many of the rule changes highlighted in this paper are aimed at making the sporting
event more exciting. These are the ones that often lead to an unexpected occurrence
which was not foreseen, even if it has the desired effect for the vast majority of the time.
Other rules have been exploited through tanking. We would argue that tanking
is always unacceptable and that any rule that provides an incentive to tank is a poor
rule. The practical realities of the sports industry is that the business model depends on
athletes always trying their best, as that’s the way it is sold to the public. There are also
integrity issues, not least of all betting markets and possible match-fixing implications.
We would expect sports administrators to say that tanking is always bad, and for the
purpose of academic discourse contributing to effective governance of the sports industry,
if they say tanking is unacceptable, this is sufficient for papers such as this to report it,
and find ways to circumvent it.
On the issue of tanking, we would like to make a final comment. If a team is trying
to lose as a means to get some some later benefit (e.g. easier next-round opponent,
higher draft pick, etc.), then that is always unacceptable. If, next year, the current
English Premier League champions were to win the title again with two games left and
decided to rest players, it could be argued that they have every right to do this. Indeed,
each team has a squad of players and, in our view, the manager can use these players as
he/she sees fit. Therefore, we would not regard this as tanking, but as using available
resources to meet the longer term aims of the club.
Other changes are concerned with tournament structures, often in the ways draws
are made to get certain teams (or groups of teams, for example continents) to be in
the same group, or to stop them being in the same group. These rule changes are less
about the sport itself but more concerned with giving underdogs a better chance than
they otherwise might have had, or to ensure that certain teams have a good chance of
progressing in order to protect TV and advertising revenue.
Other rules are aimed at making the length of a sporting event more predictable, or
ensuring that there is a winner without requiring a full replay. These rules are also the
ones that are likely to lead to undesirable outcomes.
We are grateful to Mike Wright for publishing his invited review (Wright, 2014) of
sporting rules from an OR perspective, and for his suggestion that what he covered
was just the start of many other studies. We hope that this one is the first of many
that addresses this important issue, as sports affects so many people’s lives and has an
economic impact in many regions and countries.
As we said in the introduction, the topic addressed by this paper is comprehensive,
but not exhaustive. Even while revising this article, we came across some recent ex-
amples where rules were either having unintended consequences or the authorities were
proposing changes:
1. In the U17 2016 Euro qualifying competition64. There was a scenario whereby two
teams would be better off with a score draw than either side winning.
2. The NRL are reconsidering the ‘golden point’ rule65. In last year’s Grand Final,
decided by Golden Point, North Queensland got the winning field goal on their
first set in extra time, meaning that Brisbane didn’t get a chance to respond,
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partly their own fault because of a handling error from the kick-off. The NRL are
considering adopting a similar model to the NFL (see Section 3.13.1). This would
mean that a team would have a ‘full set of six’ to respond after conceding a field
goal.
3. The AFL has scrapped the full Grand Final replay if it is drawn66. A draw has only
happened three times since the foundation of the League in 1897: in 1948, 1977 and
2010 (each time with all-Melbourne based teams). As the Grand Final is always
played at the Melbourne Cricket Ground irrespective of the teams that make it
in the now-national competition, the interstate teams (especially Fremantle) were
pushing hard for this change for quite a while, as they felt it unfair that they
would have to travel coast-to-coast a second time.
We hope that other researchers add to the literature where sporting rules have not
had the consequences that the sports’ administrators desired. Moreover, this is an inter-
disciplinary area covering OR, economics, business, game theory etc., as well as impact-
ing on the industry itself, governments, policy makers and the international committees
that govern sports.
We hope that one consequence of this paper is that the scientific community and the
sports industry can work more closely together in order to study the effects of potential
rule changes before they are implemented, or implemented in such a way that they can
be studied before wider adoption. As a call to action, perhaps the governing bodies
of the major sports could invite academic representatives onto their committees, who
would be tasked with identifying possible loopholes in proposed rule changes, perhaps in
consultation with the wider scientific community. Alternatively, proposed rule changes
could be posted in a public forum and interested academics could comment, perhaps
after running simulations?
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